Workshop on Disagreement

I think the following information might be of interest to those working on the skeptical problems posed by the existence of disagreement.

Workshop on Disagreement and Legitimacy: Value Questions and Factual Questions

Division of Philosophy, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

February 10-11, 2011

Reasonable disagreement regarding value questions and religious convictions has been debated in political philosophy for decades, with important contributions by Rawls, Barry and many others. Part of the aims of these discussions has been to identify conditions under which decisions regarding controversial moral and political questions are legitimate. Only very recently, disagreement about factual questions has been the subject to an intense discussion in epistemology. However, despite their obvious similarities and relevance for each other, the two discussions have largely proceeded independently of each other. The aim of the workshop will be to explore connections between the two philosophical problems, seeking to focus on questions such as: do views on reasonable disagreement in political philosophy depend on epistemological assumptions that have recently been uncovered in the epistemological debate on disagreement? Reasonable disagreement in political philosophy usually concerns value questions. But we evidently disagree about politically important factual questions, such as those involved in the global warming debate. Do views about reasonable disagreement carry over to factual questions? Some political or democratic decisions bind everyone in a society, but depends assumptions that are controversial for some of those affected. When are such decisions legitimate?

Speakers: Confirmed speakers include Lars Binderup, Nikolaj Lee Linding Jang Pedersen, Klemens Kappel, and Kristoffer Ahlstrom.

Inquiries: For further questions, please contact Klemens Kappel (kappel@hum.ku.dk).