Skepticism Lecture Series: Session VIII

Session VIII: Thursday, 5th August 2021, 12:00-13:30 Central Time Zone (United States and Canada) (= 11:00-12:30 Mountain Time Zone = 17:00-18:30 GMT). (Time Zones in North America take account of Daylight Saving Time.)

Speaker: Michelle Woodland (Texas Tech University).

Title: “Vogel on Inference to the Best Explanation as a Response to Underdetermination Skepticism.”

Abstract: In this paper, I will defend what Jonathan Vogel refers to as ‘domestic skepticism’ against his claim of refutation. The type of skepticism at issue concerns itself with the explanation for sensory experience. The skeptic claims that sensory experience is underdetermined between the virtual and material worlds. However, Vogel argues that the material world is the best explanation for our sensory experience. He presupposes three assumptions for what he considers the best explanation, and argues that the material world satisfies these criteria better than any skeptical hypothesis. So, according to Vogel, the material world and the virtual world are not underdetermined and we have a reason to favor the material world hypothesis. I will attempt to argue that Vogel’s refutation against underdetermination skepticism does not succeed by specifically arguing against his simplicity criterion to show that underdetermination skepticism, at least in regards to the material and virtual world hypotheses, does not yet seem to be refuted.

To join the meeting: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85822420317.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session VII

Session VII: Thursday, 15th July 2021, 12:00-13:30 Central Time (United States and Canada) (= 11:00-12:30 Mountain Time Zone = 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Kim Davis (Durham University)

Title: “Transcendental Arguments and Conceptual Development.”

Abstract: Transcendental arguments (TAs) against scepticism are out of fashion. Stroud’s persistent criticisms seem to show that the most we can hope for are modest TAs which articulate what we must believe to be the case, even if the truth of that belief cannot be proven. In this talk I will argue that the traditional starting point of TAs in subjective experience needs to be replaced by a double-headed approach if TAs are to reach conclusions concerning the truth of interesting metaphysical claims. The first strand of the approach is to clarify the critical concept of thought’, as potentially diverging from reality, as key to the sceptic’s position. The second analyses the necessary conditions of the possibility of the key concept. I will argue that the critical concept of thought is possible only through reflection on disruption in a previously unarticulated harmony between how things are thought to be and how they really are, and that this in turn requires the actual existence of – not just the belief in – an epistemically objective realm of ontologically independent items. This a-priori argument is given support from recent empirical work in conceptual development on the process of creating new conceptual resources not entirely grounded in antecedent ones.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82476774473.

Information about past and future sessions can be found here:

https://skepticismnetwork.weebly.com/skepticism-lecture-series.html

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session VI

Session VI: Thursday, 24th June 2021, 12:00-13:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Michael Vollmer (Universität Innsbruck).

Title: “From Logical Nihilism to Logical Skepticism.”

Abstract: Logical nihilism is one of the newest installments in the debate about the philosophy of logic. According to this position, there are no laws of logic and the only legitimate consequence relation is an empty one. In my talk, I will argue that the points in favor of logical nihilism should rather be seen as an argument towards logical skepticism in posing a significant challenge to any positive account of logic. Thus, my aim is threefold: First, I am going to show where the justification provided for logical nihilism is lacking. Second, by drawing on Sinnott-Armstrong's ideas on the connection between moral nihilism and moral skepticism, I will provide an analogous line of thought for the case of logic. Last, I will challenge a direct, abductivist response to the possibility of nihilism and draw some general conclusions for the epistemology of theories of logic.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81886509602.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session V

​Session V: Thursday, 20th May 2021, 12:00-13:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Jan Forsman (Tampere University).

Title: “Taking Skepticism Seriously: Descartes’s Meditations as a Cognitive Exercise and the Cartesian Epochē.”

Abstract: I argue for Descartes’s skepticism in the Meditations to be a meditative cognitive exercise targeted against both skepticism and Aristotelian-Scholasticism. While the anti-skeptical and anti-Scholastic readings are common in the literature, studies tend to make a choice, focusing either on Descartes’s metaphysical project and cognitive theory, reading them against Scholastic doctrine, or on skeptically driven epistemology and the method of doubt, reading them against skeptical history. I specifically draw from the historical genre of spiritual exercises, or meditations, prominent especially in the 16th and 17th century, that formed a part of the religious-cultural background of the period when Descartes wrote. Consequently, I argue that this understanding of the Meditations imposes certain requirements for our reading of the skeptical enquiry, it being a serious effort to overcome both the Aristotelian cognitive framework and the skeptical tradition, with intended metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical results. To emphasize this sincerity, I call the genuine suspension of judgment that one is expected to practice in the exercise Cartesian epochē.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://nmsu.zoom.us/j/95767650111.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session II

Session II: Thursday, 11th March 2021, 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Avram Hiller (Portland State University).

Title: “A New (Non-Infallibilist, Closure-Independent) Argument for Skepticism.”

Abstract: In this paper, I introduce what I take to be a new argument for skepticism. I start with the assumption that so-called “environmental” cases are genuine counterexamples to the JTB analysis of knowledge. So, to use a well-worn example, Henry, in fake barn country, does not know that there is a barn in front of him even when looking at a real barn. The reason, I argue, why Henry lacks knowledge is that there is an external (necessary) condition on knowledge – that for S to know that P, there cannot be any nearby misleaders in the environment surrounding S. (I show how this condition differs from other proposed conditions on knowledge, such as safety.) How far away can a misleader be in order for it to disqualify a potential knower from having knowledge? An inflexibilist about misleading says that a misleader can be far away (either spatially or modally) and still disqualify one from having knowledge. In this way, one can avoid being an infallibilist about justification, can avoid endorsing closure about justification or knowledge, and be a skeptic. In other words, a fallibilist inflexibilist can still hold the following four claims: (1) one is fully justified in believing that one has hands, even though at the same time (2) one has not ruled out all possible fake hand scenarios, while also (3) one does not know that one has hands, and (4) (3) is the case not because of (2) but merely because fake hands exist somewhere (or possibly exist). I give some reasons in support of fallibilist inflexibilism, and argue that it gives us exactly what we should want out of a skeptical epistemological perspective.

To join the Zoom Meeting, go here.

SLS's Inaugural Session: Reminder

I'd just like to remind you that on Thursday, February 25th, at 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (17:00-18:30 GMT), Mark Walker will present “Hubris and the Self-Undermining Objection to Conciliationism.” If you haven't received the link to join the meeting yet, please check your spam folder.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session I

The Skepticism Lecture Series (SLS) is taking shape. The first online session will take place on Zoom on February 25th, at 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (17:00-18:30 GMT). Mark Walker, Richard L. Hedden Chair of Advanced Philosophical Studies at New Mexico State University, will present “Hubris and the Self-Undermining Objection to Conciliationism.” Here's the abstract:

A familiar objection to Conciliationism is that it is self-undermining: Conciliationism (at least some forms of it) requires us to sometimes hold skeptical views about disputed matters. Since Conciliationism itself is disputed, it appears that Conciliationists should be skeptical about Conciliationism. The argument of this paper is that the philosophical opponents of Conciliationists, Steadfasters, are not epistemic peers. The hubris of Steadfasters makes them epistemic inferiors; hence, Conciliationists are not required to conciliate with Steadfasters.

If you interested in attending, please send me an email. I'll post a reminder a few days before the meeting. And a provisional webpage for the SLS can be found here.