Disagreement-Based Skepticism

In case this is of interest to you, my contribution to the symposium on Jonathan Matheson's The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (Palgrave, 2015) has now been published in Syndicate Philosophy, a recently launched journal devoted to book symposia. Together with my critical essay -- in which I focus on the connection between disagreement and skepticism -- you can find Matheson's reply and Scott Aikin's general introduction to the symposium. In the upcoming weeks, the critical essays by Amber Carlson, Chad Boghosian, and Nathan Ballantyne will be published together with the respective responses by Matheson. You can access the symposium here. The aim of Syndicate Philosophy is to start conversations about the book, the critical essays, and the author's responses, so if you're interested, you can participate by posting comments.

The Evolutionary Debunking of Morality

On November 28th, 2014, Utrecht University will host the symposium, "Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Ethics: Normative, Metaethical, and Empirical Aspects." There will be four talks:

Peter Königs: "From Moral Error Theory to Practical Error Theory."

Hanno Sauer: "The Weakest Link: Can Metaethics Protect Our Moral Beliefs from Debunking?"

Jason Clark: "Putting emotions and cognition on a par in evolutionary debunking arguments."

Joshua Tybur: "Fitting Morality Within the Evolved Function and Structure of Disgust."

More information can be found here.