The latest issue of the Brazilian journal Discurso is a special issue devoted to the thought of Oswaldo Porchat Pereira: “Ceticismo, Filosofia e História da Filosofia: Homenagem a Oswaldo Porchat.” At least eight of the articles deal with skepticism. The entire issue can be accessed for free here.
Friday, January 22, 2021
On February, 1-2, the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (Hamburg) will host the online workshop “Scepticism in Mendelssohn’s Commentary on Qohelet and His Other Hebrew Writings.” For complete information, click here.
Wednesday, January 13, 2021
In 1981, Fernanda Decleva Caizzi published Pirrone: Testimonianze (Napoli: Bibliopolis), which contains the testimonia on Pyrrho in Greek and Latin together with an Italian translation and an extensive commentary. Last year, a revised version was published under the title Pirroniana (Milano: LED). This new edition contains in addition an English translation of the textual fragments by Mauro Bonazzi and David Sedley, and three papers on Pyrrhonian skepticism by Decleva Caizzi published in 1980, 1992, and 1996. The good news is that the entire book can be legally downloaded for free here.
Friday, December 25, 2020
Sunday, December 20, 2020
Monday, December 14, 2020
Thursday, December 10, 2020
Friday, December 4, 2020
Sunday, November 29, 2020
On December 1st, Sarah Stroumsa (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) will give the online lecture “The Voice of Written Texts and the Myth of Jewish Andalusian Freethinking” as part of the Maimonides Lectures on Scepticism. For more information, go here.
Friday, November 27, 2020
Sunday, October 25, 2020
Sunday, October 18, 2020
Wednesday, October 7, 2020
Those interested in anti-realist forms of skepticism in ethics and mathematics might want to take a look at Justin Clarke-Doane's recent book, Morality and Mathematics (OUP, 2020). Here's the abstract:
To what extent are the subjects of our thoughts and talk real? This is the question of realism. In this book, Justin Clarke-Doane explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. He argues that, contrary to widespread belief, our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified than our moral beliefs. It is also incorrect that reflection on the "genealogy" of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral antirealist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical antirealist as well. And, yet, Clarke-Doane shows that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together -- and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense that mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the objective questions in the neighborhood of factual areas like logic, modality, grounding, and nature are practical questions too. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.