Brill Studies in Skepticism, Volume 4

The fourth volume of the book series Brill Studies in Skepticism is now out:

Brian Ribeiro, Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers (Brill, 2021).

For more information, go here.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session VIII

Session VIII: Thursday, 5th August 2021, 12:00-13:30 Central Time Zone (United States and Canada) (= 11:00-12:30 Mountain Time Zone = 17:00-18:30 GMT). (Time Zones in North America take account of Daylight Saving Time.)

Speaker: Michelle Woodland (Texas Tech University).

Title: “Vogel on Inference to the Best Explanation as a Response to Underdetermination Skepticism.”

Abstract: In this paper, I will defend what Jonathan Vogel refers to as ‘domestic skepticism’ against his claim of refutation. The type of skepticism at issue concerns itself with the explanation for sensory experience. The skeptic claims that sensory experience is underdetermined between the virtual and material worlds. However, Vogel argues that the material world is the best explanation for our sensory experience. He presupposes three assumptions for what he considers the best explanation, and argues that the material world satisfies these criteria better than any skeptical hypothesis. So, according to Vogel, the material world and the virtual world are not underdetermined and we have a reason to favor the material world hypothesis. I will attempt to argue that Vogel’s refutation against underdetermination skepticism does not succeed by specifically arguing against his simplicity criterion to show that underdetermination skepticism, at least in regards to the material and virtual world hypotheses, does not yet seem to be refuted.

To join the meeting: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85822420317.

Email Subscription to Aporia

In a couple of weeks, the FeedBurner email subscription will stop working. Thus far, I haven't found a good replacement, so I will try to email new posts "manually" to registered readers.

Brill Studies in Skepticism, Volume 3

The third volume of the book series Brill Studies in Skepticism is now out:

Luca Moretti and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology (Brill, 2021).

For more information, go here.

Summer School: Early Modern Skepticism

The third summer school of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, to be held on Zoom on July 18–23, will be devoted to “Facets of Early Modern Scepticism.” Participation is free and complete information can be found here.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session VII

Session VII: Thursday, 15th July 2021, 12:00-13:30 Central Time (United States and Canada) (= 11:00-12:30 Mountain Time Zone = 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Kim Davis (Durham University)

Title: “Transcendental Arguments and Conceptual Development.”

Abstract: Transcendental arguments (TAs) against scepticism are out of fashion. Stroud’s persistent criticisms seem to show that the most we can hope for are modest TAs which articulate what we must believe to be the case, even if the truth of that belief cannot be proven. In this talk I will argue that the traditional starting point of TAs in subjective experience needs to be replaced by a double-headed approach if TAs are to reach conclusions concerning the truth of interesting metaphysical claims. The first strand of the approach is to clarify the critical concept of thought’, as potentially diverging from reality, as key to the sceptic’s position. The second analyses the necessary conditions of the possibility of the key concept. I will argue that the critical concept of thought is possible only through reflection on disruption in a previously unarticulated harmony between how things are thought to be and how they really are, and that this in turn requires the actual existence of – not just the belief in – an epistemically objective realm of ontologically independent items. This a-priori argument is given support from recent empirical work in conceptual development on the process of creating new conceptual resources not entirely grounded in antecedent ones.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82476774473.

Information about past and future sessions can be found here:

https://skepticismnetwork.weebly.com/skepticism-lecture-series.html

Lecture on Maimon

As part of the Maimonides Lectures on Scepticism, on July 5, 2021, at 18:00 CEST, Jelscha Schmid (Basel) will give the lecture “Beyond Scepticism—Maimon’s Rational Dogmatism and the Method of Fictions.” More information can be found here.

You can join the meeting via Zoom: here. Meeting-ID: 983 8297 8498. Passcode: 33776553.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session VI

Session VI: Thursday, 24th June 2021, 12:00-13:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Michael Vollmer (Universität Innsbruck).

Title: “From Logical Nihilism to Logical Skepticism.”

Abstract: Logical nihilism is one of the newest installments in the debate about the philosophy of logic. According to this position, there are no laws of logic and the only legitimate consequence relation is an empty one. In my talk, I will argue that the points in favor of logical nihilism should rather be seen as an argument towards logical skepticism in posing a significant challenge to any positive account of logic. Thus, my aim is threefold: First, I am going to show where the justification provided for logical nihilism is lacking. Second, by drawing on Sinnott-Armstrong's ideas on the connection between moral nihilism and moral skepticism, I will provide an analogous line of thought for the case of logic. Last, I will challenge a direct, abductivist response to the possibility of nihilism and draw some general conclusions for the epistemology of theories of logic.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81886509602.

Workshop on Disagreement

On June 18-19, there will be an online workshop on “Ethics of Conversation and Disagreement.” Complete information, including the program, can be found here. To register, you need to contact the organizers. But if you don't get a reply soon enough, send me an email and I'll provide you with the info to join the two Zoom meetings.

Issue 11.2 of IJSS

The second issue of volume 11 (2021) of the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism has been published and can be found here. It is devoted to a symposium on Genia Schönbaumsfeld’s The Illusion of Doubt (OUP, 2016), with contributions by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Chris Ranalli, and Michael Williams.

Buddhism & Pyrrhonism

The past few months have been quite difficult, and so I haven't been able to post much. But I think I'll be able to post more information about events and publications in the upcoming weeks. Right now, I've just found out about the following intriguing talk, by Eli Franco (Senior Research Fellow at the Maimonides Centre For Advanced Studies):

Date: Wednesday, June 9, at 5.15–6.45 pm Central European Summer Time.

Title: “Buddhism and Skepticism.”

Abstract: Buddhist philosophy, and especially Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka, has often been interpreted as professing Skepticism with strong affinities to Pyrrhonism (e.g., by Grenier 1970, McEviley 1982, Matilal 1986, Hayes 1994, Burton 2004, Kuzminski 2007, 2020, Dreyfus 2011, Garfield 2011, Mills 2016, 2018, 2020 and others). I will argue in this lecture that this interpretation is, at least partly, based on a misunderstanding of Nāgārjuna’s dialectic.

The event, hosted by the Numata Center for Buddhist Studies of Universität Hamburg, will take place on Zoom. If you want to attend, you need to register via Eventbrite.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session V

​Session V: Thursday, 20th May 2021, 12:00-13:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Jan Forsman (Tampere University).

Title: “Taking Skepticism Seriously: Descartes’s Meditations as a Cognitive Exercise and the Cartesian Epochē.”

Abstract: I argue for Descartes’s skepticism in the Meditations to be a meditative cognitive exercise targeted against both skepticism and Aristotelian-Scholasticism. While the anti-skeptical and anti-Scholastic readings are common in the literature, studies tend to make a choice, focusing either on Descartes’s metaphysical project and cognitive theory, reading them against Scholastic doctrine, or on skeptically driven epistemology and the method of doubt, reading them against skeptical history. I specifically draw from the historical genre of spiritual exercises, or meditations, prominent especially in the 16th and 17th century, that formed a part of the religious-cultural background of the period when Descartes wrote. Consequently, I argue that this understanding of the Meditations imposes certain requirements for our reading of the skeptical enquiry, it being a serious effort to overcome both the Aristotelian cognitive framework and the skeptical tradition, with intended metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical results. To emphasize this sincerity, I call the genuine suspension of judgment that one is expected to practice in the exercise Cartesian epochē.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://nmsu.zoom.us/j/95767650111.

SLS, Session IV, Cancelled and Rescheduled

Due to an unexpected event, Chris Ranalli's talk, scheduled for tomorrow, had to be cancelled. It has been rescheduled for the same time next Friday, April 23rd, 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT). The zoom link is the same.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session IV

Session IV: Friday, 16th April 2021, 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Chris Ranalli (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam).

Title: “Integrity and Suspension of Judgment.”

Abstract: Some disagreements press on beliefs that are essential to who we are. I argue that if the Equal Weight View is true, then rationality can require us to make changes to who we are and what our personal lives are like by requiring us to change our identity- and meaning-conferring beliefs. This raises the question: can integrity of the self and meaning in life give us reasons to be noncompliant with the norms of rationality? According to what I call the Personal Partiality View, we sometimes have prudential reasons for not adjusting our beliefs in response to peer disagreement. Sometimes, suspending judgment is the wrong attitude because it harms oneself and others. I defend the Personal Partiality View and explore how it can account for some core steadfast and conciliatory intuitions.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://nmsu.zoom.us/j/92125487595.