SLS, Session IV, Cancelled and Rescheduled

Due to an unexpected event, Chris Ranalli's talk, scheduled for tomorrow, had to be cancelled. It has been rescheduled for the same time next Friday, April 23rd, 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT). The zoom link is the same.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session IV

Session IV: Friday, 16th April 2021, 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Chris Ranalli (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam).

Title: “Integrity and Suspension of Judgment.”

Abstract: Some disagreements press on beliefs that are essential to who we are. I argue that if the Equal Weight View is true, then rationality can require us to make changes to who we are and what our personal lives are like by requiring us to change our identity- and meaning-conferring beliefs. This raises the question: can integrity of the self and meaning in life give us reasons to be noncompliant with the norms of rationality? According to what I call the Personal Partiality View, we sometimes have prudential reasons for not adjusting our beliefs in response to peer disagreement. Sometimes, suspending judgment is the wrong attitude because it harms oneself and others. I defend the Personal Partiality View and explore how it can account for some core steadfast and conciliatory intuitions.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://nmsu.zoom.us/j/92125487595.

Issue 11.1 of IJSS

The first issue of volume 11 (2021) of the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism has now been published and can be found here.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session III

Session III: Thursday, 25th March 2021, 12:00-13:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT). [Note that, in the US, this session will start one hour later than previous sessions because of the Daylight Saving Time.]

Roger Clarke (Queen's University Belfast).

Title: “Context-Relative Belief and Skepticism in Sextus Empiricus, Nāgārjuna, and Zhuangzi.”

Abstract: Several philosophers have recently defended accounts of belief as context-relative or -sensitive in one way or another. I introduce my favourite of these, Roger Clarke’s sensitivism, and use it to give novel reconstructions of three often-compared ancient skeptics: Sextus Empiricus, Nāgārjuna, and Zhuangzi. Because belief plays a central role in the sort of skepticism attributed to each of them, one might hope new theories of belief would offer new interpretive possibilities. I’ll attempt to show not only that that hope can indeed be fulfilled—that my sensitivist reconstructions can help answer outstanding problems—but that contemporary epistemologists can benefit from scholarship on these three philosophers. (Put more crudely: I’ll exploit them to defend my pet theory against objections.)

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://nmsu.zoom.us/j/91929353155.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session II

Session II: Thursday, 11th March 2021, 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Avram Hiller (Portland State University).

Title: “A New (Non-Infallibilist, Closure-Independent) Argument for Skepticism.”

Abstract: In this paper, I introduce what I take to be a new argument for skepticism. I start with the assumption that so-called “environmental” cases are genuine counterexamples to the JTB analysis of knowledge. So, to use a well-worn example, Henry, in fake barn country, does not know that there is a barn in front of him even when looking at a real barn. The reason, I argue, why Henry lacks knowledge is that there is an external (necessary) condition on knowledge – that for S to know that P, there cannot be any nearby misleaders in the environment surrounding S. (I show how this condition differs from other proposed conditions on knowledge, such as safety.) How far away can a misleader be in order for it to disqualify a potential knower from having knowledge? An inflexibilist about misleading says that a misleader can be far away (either spatially or modally) and still disqualify one from having knowledge. In this way, one can avoid being an infallibilist about justification, can avoid endorsing closure about justification or knowledge, and be a skeptic. In other words, a fallibilist inflexibilist can still hold the following four claims: (1) one is fully justified in believing that one has hands, even though at the same time (2) one has not ruled out all possible fake hand scenarios, while also (3) one does not know that one has hands, and (4) (3) is the case not because of (2) but merely because fake hands exist somewhere (or possibly exist). I give some reasons in support of fallibilist inflexibilism, and argue that it gives us exactly what we should want out of a skeptical epistemological perspective.

To join the Zoom Meeting, go here.

SLS's Inaugural Session: Reminder

I'd just like to remind you that on Thursday, February 25th, at 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (17:00-18:30 GMT), Mark Walker will present “Hubris and the Self-Undermining Objection to Conciliationism.” If you haven't received the link to join the meeting yet, please check your spam folder.

CFP Popkin Conference

On June 21-23, the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (Hamburg University) will host the conference “Judaism, Zionism, and Scepticism in the Scholarship of Richard H. Popkin.” There is a call for papers for PhD candidates and postdocs whose deadline is February 28th. Go here for detailed information.

Dissertation on Skepticism in Descartes

On February 19th, at 15:00 Finnish time (= 13:00 GMT), Jan Forsman will defend his PhD dissertation titled “Of Dreams, Demons, and Whirlpools: Doubt, Skepticism, and Suspension of Judgment in Descartes's Meditations.” You can find a summary of the dissertation and the link to the zoom meeting here.

Spam Folder

For various reasons, lately I've been slower than usual in replying to emails. But over the past few days several people have told me that the emails from my gmail account ended up in their spam folder. So, if I still owe you a reply or if you haven't yet received the information for attending the first meeting of the Skepticism Lecture Series, please take a look there first. Thanks.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session I

The Skepticism Lecture Series (SLS) is taking shape. The first online session will take place on Zoom on February 25th, at 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (17:00-18:30 GMT). Mark Walker, Richard L. Hedden Chair of Advanced Philosophical Studies at New Mexico State University, will present “Hubris and the Self-Undermining Objection to Conciliationism.” Here's the abstract:

A familiar objection to Conciliationism is that it is self-undermining: Conciliationism (at least some forms of it) requires us to sometimes hold skeptical views about disputed matters. Since Conciliationism itself is disputed, it appears that Conciliationists should be skeptical about Conciliationism. The argument of this paper is that the philosophical opponents of Conciliationists, Steadfasters, are not epistemic peers. The hubris of Steadfasters makes them epistemic inferiors; hence, Conciliationists are not required to conciliate with Steadfasters.

If you interested in attending, please send me an email. I'll post a reminder a few days before the meeting. And a provisional webpage for the SLS can be found here.

The Skepticism of Francisco Sánchez

On Tuesday, February 9, at 7:30 pm ET, Marcelo Broitman, Adjunct Professor of Spanish at Yeshiva University, will discuss his book Francisco Sánchez y el redescubrimiento de la duda en el Renacimiento. Tracing philosophical skepticism from its origins in Ancient Greece until its recovery in the Renaissance, the book focuses on the work of Francisco Sánchez, a Spanish-Portuguese philosopher and physician of Jewish ancestry. Ronnie Perelis, Isaac Abraham, and Jelena Alcalay will moderate the discussion. You must register here to receive the Zoom link.

Skepticism Lecture Series

As some of you might know, after organizing a conference on Pyrrhonism in Buenos Aires in 2008, it seemed to me it'd be a good idea to create some sort of group that would bring together scholars from around the world working on skepticism from either a historical or a systematic perspective. It was called the International Society for the Study of Skepticism. Its main aim was to organize conferences every two or three years, but although a couple of conferences were organized by others in Brazil in the following years, the original idea wasn't feasible due to lack of resources. Instead of doing that, it seemed more realistic to launch a journal. Luckily, Brill accepted the proposal in 2010 and the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism has already published ten volumes. Now, during the initial months of the pandemic, several online colloquia and lectures series were organized with considerable success by different groups and institutions, which made me think that something similar could be done by those interested in skepticism. For various reasons, I couldn't undertake the project last year, and at this point it might be worth giving it a try. The tentative idea is to have the typical 90-minute-talk + Q&A every two weeks and to make sure to have as many groups and approaches as possible represented. I'd be grateful if those interested in participating either as speakers and/or as attendees sent me an email to diegomachuca at gmail dot com or to diegomachuca at conicet dot gov dot ar.

Porchat and Skepticism

The latest issue of the Brazilian journal Discurso is a special issue devoted to the thought of Oswaldo Porchat Pereira: “Ceticismo, Filosofia e História da Filosofia: Homenagem a Oswaldo Porchat.” At least eight of the articles deal with skepticism. The entire issue can be accessed for free here.

Workshop on Mendelssohn’s Commentary on Qohelet

On February, 1-2, the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (Hamburg) will host the online workshop “Scepticism in Mendelssohn’s Commentary on Qohelet and His Other Hebrew Writings.” For complete information, click here.