Skepticism Lecture Series: Session III

Session III: Thursday, 25th March 2021, 12:00-13:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT). [Note that, in the US, this session will start one hour later than previous sessions because of the Daylight Saving Time.]

Roger Clarke (Queen's University Belfast).

Title: “Context-Relative Belief and Skepticism in Sextus Empiricus, Nāgārjuna, and Zhuangzi.”

Abstract: Several philosophers have recently defended accounts of belief as context-relative or -sensitive in one way or another. I introduce my favourite of these, Roger Clarke’s sensitivism, and use it to give novel reconstructions of three often-compared ancient skeptics: Sextus Empiricus, Nāgārjuna, and Zhuangzi. Because belief plays a central role in the sort of skepticism attributed to each of them, one might hope new theories of belief would offer new interpretive possibilities. I’ll attempt to show not only that that hope can indeed be fulfilled—that my sensitivist reconstructions can help answer outstanding problems—but that contemporary epistemologists can benefit from scholarship on these three philosophers. (Put more crudely: I’ll exploit them to defend my pet theory against objections.)

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://nmsu.zoom.us/j/91929353155.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session II

Session II: Thursday, 11th March 2021, 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Avram Hiller (Portland State University).

Title: “A New (Non-Infallibilist, Closure-Independent) Argument for Skepticism.”

Abstract: In this paper, I introduce what I take to be a new argument for skepticism. I start with the assumption that so-called “environmental” cases are genuine counterexamples to the JTB analysis of knowledge. So, to use a well-worn example, Henry, in fake barn country, does not know that there is a barn in front of him even when looking at a real barn. The reason, I argue, why Henry lacks knowledge is that there is an external (necessary) condition on knowledge – that for S to know that P, there cannot be any nearby misleaders in the environment surrounding S. (I show how this condition differs from other proposed conditions on knowledge, such as safety.) How far away can a misleader be in order for it to disqualify a potential knower from having knowledge? An inflexibilist about misleading says that a misleader can be far away (either spatially or modally) and still disqualify one from having knowledge. In this way, one can avoid being an infallibilist about justification, can avoid endorsing closure about justification or knowledge, and be a skeptic. In other words, a fallibilist inflexibilist can still hold the following four claims: (1) one is fully justified in believing that one has hands, even though at the same time (2) one has not ruled out all possible fake hand scenarios, while also (3) one does not know that one has hands, and (4) (3) is the case not because of (2) but merely because fake hands exist somewhere (or possibly exist). I give some reasons in support of fallibilist inflexibilism, and argue that it gives us exactly what we should want out of a skeptical epistemological perspective.

To join the Zoom Meeting, go here.