Call for Applications - Research Associate

There's a call for applications for a Research Associate at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (Universität Hamburg). Complete information can be found here. As far as I know, this is an excellent position, so if you can, go ahead and apply.

Issue 11.4 of IJSS

The fourth issue of volume 11 (2021) of the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism has been published and can be found here. It includes articles by Tim Black, Christopher Stratman, and Patrick Bondy.

CFA: Fellowships at MCAS

There's a call for applications for doctoral, postdoctoral, and senior fellowships for the academic year 2022-2023 at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (Universität Hamburg). This is an excellent opportunity for those interested in working on the topic “Limits of Faith, Limits of Scepticism.” For complete information, go here.

MCAS's Annual Lecture

The Annual Lecture of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (Universität Hamburg) will take place on 26 October 2021, at 18:00 (local time). Vivian Liska (Universiteit Antwerpen) will present the paper “Holy Doubts: Language Scepticism in German-Jewish Modernism.” You'll find complete information here.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session IX

Session IX: Thursday, 21st October 2021, 12:00-13:30 Central Time Zone (United States and Canada) (= 11:00-12:30 Mountain Time Zone = 17:00-18:30 GMT). (Time Zones in North America take account of Daylight Saving Time.)

Speaker: John Pittard (Yale University)

Title: “How Should We Respond to Evidence of Boltzmann Brain Superabundance?”

Abstract: A “Boltzmann Brain” is a “brain” that forms by chance in an otherwise disordered region of space. Some leading cosmological models predict that in the future history of the universe, there are sure to be numerous Boltzmann Brains that pass through a sequence of physical states that mirror states of your own brain over the last several seconds. Plausibly, these Boltzmann Brains would have an episode of conscious experience that is phenomenally equivalent to your recent experience. In this paper, I assess the skeptical challenge posed by scientific support for Boltzmann Brain superabundance. I begin by critiquing a recent treatment of Boltzmann Brain skepticism by Dogramaci, explaining why his response has absurd implications and is not germane to the most formidable skeptical worry posed by predictions of Boltzmann Brains. I then consider other responses, including an argument articulated by Kotzen and Chalmers that says that the coherence of one’s present experience provides strong evidence against theories predicting Boltzmann Brains. While this argument has promise, it depends on controversial principles of “observation selection theory” that can be used to support dubious positions such as an anthropocentric theory of consciousness.

To join the meeting: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88352861727

Information about past and upcoming sessions can be found here: https://skepticismnetwork.weebly.com/skepticism-lecture-series.html

Arcesilaus's Attack on Stoic Metaphysics

Those working on Academic skepticism might be interested in the following recent book:

Charles Snyder, Beyond Hellenistic Epistemology: Arcesilaus and the Destruction of Stoic Metaphysics. Bloomsbury Academic, 2021.

More information can be found here.

Issue 11.3 of IJSS

The third issue of volume 11 (2021) of the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism has been published and can be found here. It includes articles by François-Xavier de Peretti and Marin Geier, discussions by Ryan McCoy and Howard Sankey, and book reviews by Stéphane Marchand and Roger Clarke.

Brill Studies in Skepticism, Volume 4

The fourth volume of the book series Brill Studies in Skepticism is now out:

Brian Ribeiro, Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers (Brill, 2021).

For more information, go here.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session VIII

Session VIII: Thursday, 5th August 2021, 12:00-13:30 Central Time Zone (United States and Canada) (= 11:00-12:30 Mountain Time Zone = 17:00-18:30 GMT). (Time Zones in North America take account of Daylight Saving Time.)

Speaker: Michelle Woodland (Texas Tech University).

Title: “Vogel on Inference to the Best Explanation as a Response to Underdetermination Skepticism.”

Abstract: In this paper, I will defend what Jonathan Vogel refers to as ‘domestic skepticism’ against his claim of refutation. The type of skepticism at issue concerns itself with the explanation for sensory experience. The skeptic claims that sensory experience is underdetermined between the virtual and material worlds. However, Vogel argues that the material world is the best explanation for our sensory experience. He presupposes three assumptions for what he considers the best explanation, and argues that the material world satisfies these criteria better than any skeptical hypothesis. So, according to Vogel, the material world and the virtual world are not underdetermined and we have a reason to favor the material world hypothesis. I will attempt to argue that Vogel’s refutation against underdetermination skepticism does not succeed by specifically arguing against his simplicity criterion to show that underdetermination skepticism, at least in regards to the material and virtual world hypotheses, does not yet seem to be refuted.

To join the meeting: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85822420317.

Email Subscription to Aporia

In a couple of weeks, the FeedBurner email subscription will stop working. Thus far, I haven't found a good replacement, so I will try to email new posts "manually" to registered readers.

Brill Studies in Skepticism, Volume 3

The third volume of the book series Brill Studies in Skepticism is now out:

Luca Moretti and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology (Brill, 2021).

For more information, go here.

Summer School: Early Modern Skepticism

The third summer school of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, to be held on Zoom on July 18–23, will be devoted to “Facets of Early Modern Scepticism.” Participation is free and complete information can be found here.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session VII

Session VII: Thursday, 15th July 2021, 12:00-13:30 Central Time (United States and Canada) (= 11:00-12:30 Mountain Time Zone = 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Kim Davis (Durham University)

Title: “Transcendental Arguments and Conceptual Development.”

Abstract: Transcendental arguments (TAs) against scepticism are out of fashion. Stroud’s persistent criticisms seem to show that the most we can hope for are modest TAs which articulate what we must believe to be the case, even if the truth of that belief cannot be proven. In this talk I will argue that the traditional starting point of TAs in subjective experience needs to be replaced by a double-headed approach if TAs are to reach conclusions concerning the truth of interesting metaphysical claims. The first strand of the approach is to clarify the critical concept of thought’, as potentially diverging from reality, as key to the sceptic’s position. The second analyses the necessary conditions of the possibility of the key concept. I will argue that the critical concept of thought is possible only through reflection on disruption in a previously unarticulated harmony between how things are thought to be and how they really are, and that this in turn requires the actual existence of – not just the belief in – an epistemically objective realm of ontologically independent items. This a-priori argument is given support from recent empirical work in conceptual development on the process of creating new conceptual resources not entirely grounded in antecedent ones.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82476774473.

Information about past and future sessions can be found here:

https://skepticismnetwork.weebly.com/skepticism-lecture-series.html

Lecture on Maimon

As part of the Maimonides Lectures on Scepticism, on July 5, 2021, at 18:00 CEST, Jelscha Schmid (Basel) will give the lecture “Beyond Scepticism—Maimon’s Rational Dogmatism and the Method of Fictions.” More information can be found here.

You can join the meeting via Zoom: here. Meeting-ID: 983 8297 8498. Passcode: 33776553.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session VI

Session VI: Thursday, 24th June 2021, 12:00-13:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Michael Vollmer (Universität Innsbruck).

Title: “From Logical Nihilism to Logical Skepticism.”

Abstract: Logical nihilism is one of the newest installments in the debate about the philosophy of logic. According to this position, there are no laws of logic and the only legitimate consequence relation is an empty one. In my talk, I will argue that the points in favor of logical nihilism should rather be seen as an argument towards logical skepticism in posing a significant challenge to any positive account of logic. Thus, my aim is threefold: First, I am going to show where the justification provided for logical nihilism is lacking. Second, by drawing on Sinnott-Armstrong's ideas on the connection between moral nihilism and moral skepticism, I will provide an analogous line of thought for the case of logic. Last, I will challenge a direct, abductivist response to the possibility of nihilism and draw some general conclusions for the epistemology of theories of logic.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81886509602.

Workshop on Disagreement

On June 18-19, there will be an online workshop on “Ethics of Conversation and Disagreement.” Complete information, including the program, can be found here. To register, you need to contact the organizers. But if you don't get a reply soon enough, send me an email and I'll provide you with the info to join the two Zoom meetings.

Issue 11.2 of IJSS

The second issue of volume 11 (2021) of the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism has been published and can be found here. It is devoted to a symposium on Genia Schönbaumsfeld’s The Illusion of Doubt (OUP, 2016), with contributions by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Chris Ranalli, and Michael Williams.

Buddhism & Pyrrhonism

The past few months have been quite difficult, and so I haven't been able to post much. But I think I'll be able to post more information about events and publications in the upcoming weeks. Right now, I've just found out about the following intriguing talk, by Eli Franco (Senior Research Fellow at the Maimonides Centre For Advanced Studies):

Date: Wednesday, June 9, at 5.15–6.45 pm Central European Summer Time.

Title: “Buddhism and Skepticism.”

Abstract: Buddhist philosophy, and especially Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka, has often been interpreted as professing Skepticism with strong affinities to Pyrrhonism (e.g., by Grenier 1970, McEviley 1982, Matilal 1986, Hayes 1994, Burton 2004, Kuzminski 2007, 2020, Dreyfus 2011, Garfield 2011, Mills 2016, 2018, 2020 and others). I will argue in this lecture that this interpretation is, at least partly, based on a misunderstanding of Nāgārjuna’s dialectic.

The event, hosted by the Numata Center for Buddhist Studies of Universität Hamburg, will take place on Zoom. If you want to attend, you need to register via Eventbrite.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session V

​Session V: Thursday, 20th May 2021, 12:00-13:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Jan Forsman (Tampere University).

Title: “Taking Skepticism Seriously: Descartes’s Meditations as a Cognitive Exercise and the Cartesian Epochē.”

Abstract: I argue for Descartes’s skepticism in the Meditations to be a meditative cognitive exercise targeted against both skepticism and Aristotelian-Scholasticism. While the anti-skeptical and anti-Scholastic readings are common in the literature, studies tend to make a choice, focusing either on Descartes’s metaphysical project and cognitive theory, reading them against Scholastic doctrine, or on skeptically driven epistemology and the method of doubt, reading them against skeptical history. I specifically draw from the historical genre of spiritual exercises, or meditations, prominent especially in the 16th and 17th century, that formed a part of the religious-cultural background of the period when Descartes wrote. Consequently, I argue that this understanding of the Meditations imposes certain requirements for our reading of the skeptical enquiry, it being a serious effort to overcome both the Aristotelian cognitive framework and the skeptical tradition, with intended metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical results. To emphasize this sincerity, I call the genuine suspension of judgment that one is expected to practice in the exercise Cartesian epochē.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://nmsu.zoom.us/j/95767650111.

SLS, Session IV, Cancelled and Rescheduled

Due to an unexpected event, Chris Ranalli's talk, scheduled for tomorrow, had to be cancelled. It has been rescheduled for the same time next Friday, April 23rd, 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT). The zoom link is the same.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session IV

Session IV: Friday, 16th April 2021, 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Speaker: Chris Ranalli (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam).

Title: “Integrity and Suspension of Judgment.”

Abstract: Some disagreements press on beliefs that are essential to who we are. I argue that if the Equal Weight View is true, then rationality can require us to make changes to who we are and what our personal lives are like by requiring us to change our identity- and meaning-conferring beliefs. This raises the question: can integrity of the self and meaning in life give us reasons to be noncompliant with the norms of rationality? According to what I call the Personal Partiality View, we sometimes have prudential reasons for not adjusting our beliefs in response to peer disagreement. Sometimes, suspending judgment is the wrong attitude because it harms oneself and others. I defend the Personal Partiality View and explore how it can account for some core steadfast and conciliatory intuitions.

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://nmsu.zoom.us/j/92125487595.

Issue 11.1 of IJSS

The first issue of volume 11 (2021) of the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism has now been published and can be found here.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session III

Session III: Thursday, 25th March 2021, 12:00-13:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT). [Note that, in the US, this session will start one hour later than previous sessions because of the Daylight Saving Time.]

Roger Clarke (Queen's University Belfast).

Title: “Context-Relative Belief and Skepticism in Sextus Empiricus, Nāgārjuna, and Zhuangzi.”

Abstract: Several philosophers have recently defended accounts of belief as context-relative or -sensitive in one way or another. I introduce my favourite of these, Roger Clarke’s sensitivism, and use it to give novel reconstructions of three often-compared ancient skeptics: Sextus Empiricus, Nāgārjuna, and Zhuangzi. Because belief plays a central role in the sort of skepticism attributed to each of them, one might hope new theories of belief would offer new interpretive possibilities. I’ll attempt to show not only that that hope can indeed be fulfilled—that my sensitivist reconstructions can help answer outstanding problems—but that contemporary epistemologists can benefit from scholarship on these three philosophers. (Put more crudely: I’ll exploit them to defend my pet theory against objections.)

To join the Zoom meeting, go here: https://nmsu.zoom.us/j/91929353155.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session II

Session II: Thursday, 11th March 2021, 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (= 17:00-18:30 GMT).

Avram Hiller (Portland State University).

Title: “A New (Non-Infallibilist, Closure-Independent) Argument for Skepticism.”

Abstract: In this paper, I introduce what I take to be a new argument for skepticism. I start with the assumption that so-called “environmental” cases are genuine counterexamples to the JTB analysis of knowledge. So, to use a well-worn example, Henry, in fake barn country, does not know that there is a barn in front of him even when looking at a real barn. The reason, I argue, why Henry lacks knowledge is that there is an external (necessary) condition on knowledge – that for S to know that P, there cannot be any nearby misleaders in the environment surrounding S. (I show how this condition differs from other proposed conditions on knowledge, such as safety.) How far away can a misleader be in order for it to disqualify a potential knower from having knowledge? An inflexibilist about misleading says that a misleader can be far away (either spatially or modally) and still disqualify one from having knowledge. In this way, one can avoid being an infallibilist about justification, can avoid endorsing closure about justification or knowledge, and be a skeptic. In other words, a fallibilist inflexibilist can still hold the following four claims: (1) one is fully justified in believing that one has hands, even though at the same time (2) one has not ruled out all possible fake hand scenarios, while also (3) one does not know that one has hands, and (4) (3) is the case not because of (2) but merely because fake hands exist somewhere (or possibly exist). I give some reasons in support of fallibilist inflexibilism, and argue that it gives us exactly what we should want out of a skeptical epistemological perspective.

To join the Zoom Meeting, go here.

SLS's Inaugural Session: Reminder

I'd just like to remind you that on Thursday, February 25th, at 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (17:00-18:30 GMT), Mark Walker will present “Hubris and the Self-Undermining Objection to Conciliationism.” If you haven't received the link to join the meeting yet, please check your spam folder.

CFP Popkin Conference

On June 21-23, the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (Hamburg University) will host the conference “Judaism, Zionism, and Scepticism in the Scholarship of Richard H. Popkin.” There is a call for papers for PhD candidates and postdocs whose deadline is February 28th. Go here for detailed information.

Dissertation on Skepticism in Descartes

On February 19th, at 15:00 Finnish time (= 13:00 GMT), Jan Forsman will defend his PhD dissertation titled “Of Dreams, Demons, and Whirlpools: Doubt, Skepticism, and Suspension of Judgment in Descartes's Meditations.” You can find a summary of the dissertation and the link to the zoom meeting here.

Spam Folder

For various reasons, lately I've been slower than usual in replying to emails. But over the past few days several people have told me that the emails from my gmail account ended up in their spam folder. So, if I still owe you a reply or if you haven't yet received the information for attending the first meeting of the Skepticism Lecture Series, please take a look there first. Thanks.

Skepticism Lecture Series: Session I

The Skepticism Lecture Series (SLS) is taking shape. The first online session will take place on Zoom on February 25th, at 11:00-12:30 US Central Time (17:00-18:30 GMT). Mark Walker, Richard L. Hedden Chair of Advanced Philosophical Studies at New Mexico State University, will present “Hubris and the Self-Undermining Objection to Conciliationism.” Here's the abstract:

A familiar objection to Conciliationism is that it is self-undermining: Conciliationism (at least some forms of it) requires us to sometimes hold skeptical views about disputed matters. Since Conciliationism itself is disputed, it appears that Conciliationists should be skeptical about Conciliationism. The argument of this paper is that the philosophical opponents of Conciliationists, Steadfasters, are not epistemic peers. The hubris of Steadfasters makes them epistemic inferiors; hence, Conciliationists are not required to conciliate with Steadfasters.

If you interested in attending, please send me an email. I'll post a reminder a few days before the meeting. And a provisional webpage for the SLS can be found here.

The Skepticism of Francisco Sánchez

On Tuesday, February 9, at 7:30 pm ET, Marcelo Broitman, Adjunct Professor of Spanish at Yeshiva University, will discuss his book Francisco Sánchez y el redescubrimiento de la duda en el Renacimiento. Tracing philosophical skepticism from its origins in Ancient Greece until its recovery in the Renaissance, the book focuses on the work of Francisco Sánchez, a Spanish-Portuguese philosopher and physician of Jewish ancestry. Ronnie Perelis, Isaac Abraham, and Jelena Alcalay will moderate the discussion. You must register here to receive the Zoom link.

Skepticism Lecture Series

As some of you might know, after organizing a conference on Pyrrhonism in Buenos Aires in 2008, it seemed to me it'd be a good idea to create some sort of group that would bring together scholars from around the world working on skepticism from either a historical or a systematic perspective. It was called the International Society for the Study of Skepticism. Its main aim was to organize conferences every two or three years, but although a couple of conferences were organized by others in Brazil in the following years, the original idea wasn't feasible due to lack of resources. Instead of doing that, it seemed more realistic to launch a journal. Luckily, Brill accepted the proposal in 2010 and the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism has already published ten volumes. Now, during the initial months of the pandemic, several online colloquia and lectures series were organized with considerable success by different groups and institutions, which made me think that something similar could be done by those interested in skepticism. For various reasons, I couldn't undertake the project last year, and at this point it might be worth giving it a try. The tentative idea is to have the typical 90-minute-talk + Q&A every two weeks and to make sure to have as many groups and approaches as possible represented. I'd be grateful if those interested in participating either as speakers and/or as attendees sent me an email to diegomachuca at gmail dot com or to diegomachuca at conicet dot gov dot ar.

Porchat and Skepticism

The latest issue of the Brazilian journal Discurso is a special issue devoted to the thought of Oswaldo Porchat Pereira: “Ceticismo, Filosofia e História da Filosofia: Homenagem a Oswaldo Porchat.” At least eight of the articles deal with skepticism. The entire issue can be accessed for free here.

Workshop on Mendelssohn’s Commentary on Qohelet

On February, 1-2, the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (Hamburg) will host the online workshop “Scepticism in Mendelssohn’s Commentary on Qohelet and His Other Hebrew Writings.” For complete information, click here.

Decleva Caizzi's Pirroniana

In 1981, Fernanda Decleva Caizzi published Pirrone: Testimonianze (Napoli: Bibliopolis), which contains the testimonia on Pyrrho in Greek and Latin together with an Italian translation and an extensive commentary. Last year, a revised version was published under the title Pirroniana (Milano: LED). This new edition contains in addition an English translation of the textual fragments by Mauro Bonazzi and David Sedley, and three papers on Pyrrhonian skepticism by Decleva Caizzi published in 1980, 1992, and 1996. The good news is that the entire book can be legally downloaded for free here.