The latest issue of the Italian journal Elenchos (41/2, 2020) contains Roger Eichorn's “The Elusive Third Way: The Pyrrhonian Illumination in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.” It can be found here.
Friday, December 25, 2020
Monday, December 14, 2020
Agnosticism
There's a new collective volume on religious agnosticism: Francis Fallon and Gavin Hyman (eds.), Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought (OUP, 2020). More information here.
Friday, December 4, 2020
Summer School at Maimonides Centre
There's a Call for Applications for the summer school “Facets of Early Modern Scepticism,” which will take place at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (Hamburg University) on July 18-23, 2021. For complete information, go here.
Sunday, November 29, 2020
Jewish Andalusian Freethinking
On December 1st, Sarah Stroumsa (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) will give the online lecture “The Voice of Written Texts and the Myth of Jewish Andalusian Freethinking” as part of the Maimonides Lectures on Scepticism. For more information, go here.
Friday, November 27, 2020
10th Anniversary Issue of IJSS
Sunday, October 25, 2020
Moore against the Skeptic
Sunday, October 18, 2020
Annual Lecture at MCAS
Wednesday, October 7, 2020
Ethics and Mathematics
Those interested in anti-realist forms of skepticism in ethics and mathematics might want to take a look at Justin Clarke-Doane's recent book, Morality and Mathematics (OUP, 2020). Here's the abstract:
To what extent are the subjects of our thoughts and talk real? This is the question of realism. In this book, Justin Clarke-Doane explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. He argues that, contrary to widespread belief, our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified than our moral beliefs. It is also incorrect that reflection on the "genealogy" of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral antirealist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical antirealist as well. And, yet, Clarke-Doane shows that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together -- and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense that mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the objective questions in the neighborhood of factual areas like logic, modality, grounding, and nature are practical questions too. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.
Friday, October 2, 2020
Evolution in Morality and Theological Ethics
The latest issue of the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion includes a section devoted to “Evolutionary Research on Morality and Theological Ethics.” The issue also contains a couple of papers on religious agnosticism.
Sunday, September 27, 2020
Call for Applications - Hamburg
Wednesday, September 23, 2020
Sextus on Ataraxia
Wednesday, September 16, 2020
Skepticism and Its Epistemic and Practical Value
Friday, September 4, 2020
Book Review and Something Else
Yesterday, my review of the volume Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus (OUP, 2020), edited by K. Vogt and J. Vlasits, was published in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. The review can be found here. As you may know, reviews in that journal are by invitation only. I assume the previous editor (who resigned at the very beginning of July) invited me because I'm somewhat familiar with Sextus's Pyrrhonism and his legacy. So far, so good. But just a couple of hours ago, a note by the current editor was added above the second paragraph of the review. Below, I paste the note and the paragraph in italics:
Editor’s note: NDPR has reason to doubt the accuracy of some of the empirical claims in the following paragraph. We are not in position to verify the empirical claims, but we flag the issue for readers.
No, I was not contacted by the NDPR editor before the note was added, but only afterwards, letting me know about the addition. So I was not asked to provide evidence for my claims. I confess that I find the note utterly odd and a little bit offensive; and this is the first time I see such note in a book review published in NDPR, Philosophy in Review, or Bryn Mawr Classical Review -- two name the three most important electronic journals entirely devoted to book reviews. It does not seem unreasonable to expect that, if an editor thinks that a factual mistake might have been made, he will do his best first to find out what the alleged mistake is, and then to correct it, instead of inserting a note calling into question a reviewer's credibility in an extremely vague way. I assume that his not being in a position to verify the empirical claims in question does not have to do with, e.g., his not having a copy of the book or his not being able to count, but rather with the philosophical problem of verification discussed by, e.g., the logical positivists. By my lights, one of the editors of the volume sent an angry email to the NDPR editor complaining about my sacrilegious remarks and my negative assessment of the volume as a whole. And by my lights, the note in question would not have been added if the reviewer were an European working at a top American university. I reckon that, next time, I should be a good boy and write a highly positive review of a volume despite its many shortcomings, if its editor happens to be part of the so-called academic elite. Last but not least, as an journal editor myself, it never ceases to amaze me how certain journal editors proceed. Academic bullying at its best.
Update: the NDPR editor refuses to tell me which statements are possibly inaccurate and what reasons he has for calling their accuracy into question. He says it's confidential. I didn't know that academic philosophy was a matter of national security. My complaint concerns the unprofessional way the NDPR editor proceeded and the fact that, if I happened to make an inadvertent factual mistake, I'm happy to recognize and correct it. That said, I prefer the note to be left unchanged because I think it's silly, and also reveals the childish reactions of the editor(s) of the volume, who made a fuss about my remarks. In any case, the book review is open access and anyone can assess the strength and accuracy of my remarks and objections and the pertinence of the editor's note.
Monday, August 3, 2020
Position in Hamburg
Saturday, August 1, 2020
Shakespeare on Uncertainty and Doubt
Tuesday, July 21, 2020
Judah Halevi’s Skepticism
Tuesday, July 7, 2020
Discrimination and Hypocrisy in Academia
Tuesday, June 23, 2020
Yearbook of the MCAS
Wednesday, June 17, 2020
Issue 10.2 of IJSS
Monday, May 25, 2020
New Facebook Group
Tuesday, May 19, 2020
Polish Translation of Sextus
Sekstus Empiryk, Zarysy Pyrrońskie. Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK 2019.
You can find a note on the translation in English here.