Believing Out of Need

A couple of days ago, I reread parts of Mark Rowlands's The Philosopher and the Wolf: Lessons from the Wild on Love, Death & Happiness (Granta, 2008). At one point, Rowlands writes: “I once had a colleague who was unusual among philosophers in that he was a believer. He always used to tell his students: when the shit hits the fan, you will believe. Maybe that's what happens. When the shit hits the fan, people look for God. When the shit hits the fan, I remember a little wolf cub”. Due to several unfortunate events that have occurred over the year, for the past few days I've been thinking about the issue of believing out of need (or desire or desperation). Over the years, I've heard or read the kind of remark made by Rowlands's former colleague; it is something most people say when confronted with someone professing, e.g., some form of radical skepticism. Even though I do understand the “logic” of such a stance, it appears to me that, in the end, it all comes down to each person's temperament. Once or twice in the course of my life, I felt the need to believe in something that is religious or metaphysical in nature, but after a few seconds, I told myself that as a matter of fact I didn't, the reason being that I couldn't hold religious or metaphysical beliefs simply because I needed to. Of course, this issue has to do with whether one can hold beliefs only on the basis of evidence of some sort or whether one can also hold beliefs out of need. In other words, do we always need epistemic reasons or are we also able to hold beliefs merely on the basis of pragmatic reasons? In my experience, it seems that quite a number of people can start believing in God, the afterlife, the soul, or what have you after having been confronted with extreme situations, but it is also clear that even when the shit hits the fan, some who would love to find solace in such beliefs are as a matter of fact unable to hold them -- for them pragmatic reasons are not enough. I'm considering the issue from a psychological point of view (is it psychologically possible for us to hold beliefs only because it is useful for us to do so?) and leaving aside the normative question of whether one should believe in x only on the basis of pragmatic reasons.

CFP for Special Issue of Theoria

There's a call for papers for a special issue of the Swedish journal Theoria devoted to medieval skepticism. Complete information below:

Guest Editor: Henrik Lagerlund (Stockholm University), henrik.lagerlund@philosophy.su.se.

Deadline for submissions: September 1, 2019

Description: The high point of scholarly debate on the history of skepticism was the 1970’s and the 1980’s. It was Ancient and Early Modern skepticism that was debated then, and some groundbreaking books and articles were produced as a result. After that intense debate the interest waned somewhat and the history of skepticism does not attract as much interest anymore. Scholarly debate on Medieval skepticism has never reached such a highpoint, in fact, there has been relatively little interest in skeptical debates and skepticism in the Middle Ages. By devoting a special issue of Theoria to Medieval skepticism, we hope to change this and interest a new generation of scholars in questions about the role skepticism and skeptical arguments played in the Middle Ages. In this context, we define Medieval philosophy broadly to include philosophy and philosophical theology between the time of Augustine and Francisco Suárez, that is, roughly between 400 and 1600 CE. We also welcome articles dealing with skepticism in any of the four language traditions, that is, Latin, Arabic, Hebrew, and Greek. Our hope is to present skepticism in the Middle Ages in a new light, and with such breadth and depth that Medieval skepticism can finally take its place in a comprehensive history of skepticism alongside Ancient and Modern.

All submitted articles should be written in English and will be subject to double blind review. To find out more about the journal and how to submit your article please go to: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17552567