Suspending Judgment

In this last post of the year, I would like to let you know about this early-view paper by Jane Friedman forthcoming in Noûs: “Why Suspending Judgment.” Interestingly, she defends a view remarkably similar to Sextus's. It can be found here.

Moore's Proof

The latest issue of the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy features Kevin Morris and Consuelo Preti's paper “How to Read Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’.” It can be accessed for free here.

Skepticism about Skepticism

The latest issue of Philosophy contains Nick Zangwill's "Scepticism about Scepticism," which you can find here. I haven't read it yet, but needless to say I regard any attack on skepticism as sacrilegious.

Pyrrhonian Relativism

In case you’re interested, my paper “Pyrrhonian Relativism” has just been published in Elenchos 36 (2015): 89-114. It can be found here -- if you don't have access and would like to have a copy, contact me. And here’s the abstract:

This paper argues that Sextus Empiricus’s Pyrrhonism is a form of relativism markedly different from the positions typically referred to by this term. The scholars who have explored the relativistic elements found in Sextus’s texts have claimed that his outlook is not actually a form of relativism, or that those elements are inconsistent with his account of Pyrrhonism, or that he is confusing skepticism with relativism. The reason for these views is twofold: first, when employing the term “relativism” one hardly has in mind the sort of relativistic stance adopted by the Pyrrhonist; and second, those scholars have misinterpreted Sextus’s relativistic remarks. The purpose of this paper is to show that he adopts a phenomenological kind of relativism that is compatible with his account of Pyrrhonism.