Monday, January 23, 2012

McGrath & King on Skepticism about Moral Knowledge

A couple of years ago, Sarah McGrath (Princeton) published "Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise," Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3 (2008): 87-107 (the paper is available here). A recent issue of the Journal of Philosophical Research contains a debate between her and Nathan King (Whitworth):

King, "McGrath on Moral Knowledge," Journal of Philosophical Research 36 (2011): 219-33.

McGrath, "Reply to King," Journal of Philosophical Research 36 (2011): 235-41.

King, "Rejoinder to McGrath," Journal of Philosophical Research 36 (2011): 243-46.

These three pieces are available on the Philosophy Documentation Center's website.

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